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Peace operations in-
volve the dispatch of expeditionary forces, with or without a United Nations
(UN) mandate, to implement an agreement between warring states or factions,
which may (or may not) include enforcing that agreement in the face of willful
deªance. Although the UN has the most experience in authorizing and con-
ducting such operations, the organization has never possessed a monopoly on
them. This situation has become more obvious in recent years as a variety of
non-UN actors have conducted peace operations, often without the Security
Council’s authorization. In Africa, for instance, since 1990 regional organi-
zations have conducted ten peace operations: ªve by the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS), two under the mantle of the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), one by the Economic and Mone-
tary Community of Central African States (CEMAC), and two by the African
Union (AU).1 Africans have also witnessed British operations in Sierra Leone;
French operations in Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire; a South
African detachment deployed to Burundi; and a French-led force dispatched to
the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In Europe, Italy
led a peace operation in Albania in 1997; Russian troops—often under the um-
brella of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—have deployed to
Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) continues to lead a large peace operation in Kosovo and in December
2004 handed control of its Bosnia operation over to the European Union (EU).
In addition, in 2003 NATO took command of the International Security Assis-
tance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In the same year, following NATO’s de-
parture, the EU conducted Operation Concordia in Macedonia and followed it
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1. These operations took place in Liberia (twice), Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Le-
sotho, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Burundi, and Sudan respectively.
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on with a police mission, Proxima. In the Americas, the United States led a
multinational force into Haiti after the departure of President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide in the spring of 2004. Finally, in Asia, Australia has led two peace op-
erations: one to East Timor in 1999 and the other to the Solomon Islands since
2003.
These developments have reinvigorated older debates about which actors
and institutions can authorize and conduct peace operations most effectively.
Thus far, much of the literature discussing these issues has been framed in
terms of the debate about “regionalization,” that is, how to devise the most ap-
propriate relationship between the UN and regional arrangements in matters
related to international peace and security. The label “regionalization,” how-
ever, does not accurately reºect recent trends in peace operations. As we dem-
onstrate, not only have regional arrangements sometimes gone out-of-area,
but non-UN peace operations have also been conducted by individual states
and coalitions of the willing. This raises the thorny issue of how to evaluate
these different types of non-UN peace operations and their impact on what the
UN charter refers to as “international peace and security.”2 We argue that this
can be done by assessing these operations in terms of their legitimacy, their ef-
fectiveness in achieving their mandate, and their ability to contribute to stable
peace and security in the respective region. In developing these criteria, we
reªne several earlier attempts to evaluate peace operations in a way that takes
account of the different types of actors authorizing and conducting them.3 We
contend that the non-UN peace operations assessed here have not fundamen-
tally challenged international society’s norm of nonintervention without host-
state consent. There is, however, a danger that the persistent recourse to non-
UN operations may reduce the likelihood that poorer parts of the world will
enjoy the beneªts of high-quality peace operations as envisioned by the so-
called Brahimi report.4
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2. It is not our intention in this article to explain the rise in non-UN peace operations.
3. Earlier attempts to evaluate peace operations include William J. Durch, “Keeping the Peace:
Politics and Lessons of the 1990s,” in Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil
Wars of the 1990s (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 17–22; Steven Ratner, The New UN
Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conºict after the Cold War (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995); A.B.
Featherston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994); R.C.
Johansen, “UN Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success?” Mershon International Studies
Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 (October 1994), pp. 307–310; and Daniel Druckman and Paul Stern, “Perspec-
tives on Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions,” International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1
(1999), pp. 1–14.
4. “The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations” (A/55/305 S/2000/809) is commonly re-
ferred to as the Brahimi report after its chairman, former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar
To explore these claims, the article proceeds in four parts. In the opening sec-
tion we discuss the debates generated by non-UN peace operations during the
Cold War and in more recent years, and brieºy highlight the limitations im-
posed by thinking of these developments in terms of regionalization. The sec-
ond section develops a typology of non-UN peace operations according to the
different actors conducting and authorizing them, namely, individual states,
coalitions of the willing, and regional arrangements. The third section devel-
ops criteria to evaluate these operations in terms of their legitimacy, success
in accomplishing the mandate, and contribution to stable peace and secu-
rity. We then use these criteria to assess a contemporary example of each type
of non-UN peace operation, namely, British operations in Sierra Leone, the
Australian-led coalition in the Solomon Islands, and the African Union’s mis-
sion in Burundi.
The Proliferation of Non-UN Peace Operations
Although scholars and practitioners have recognized the proliferation of ac-
tors conducting peace operations, most analyses have focused on the problems
and prospects of regional arrangements acting as peacekeepers and peace en-
forcers.5 On the one hand, there are those who believe that regional solutions
could bridge the gap between means and ends that plagued peace operations
in the early 1990s and offer an alternative to the “corrupt,” “wasteful,” “politi-
cized,” and “overly bureaucratized” practices of the UN.6 On the other hand,
there are those, including many former and current senior UN ªgures, who in-
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Brahimi. The report was published in August 2000 in response to UN Secretary-General Koª
Annan’s request that the panel thoroughly review the UN’s “peace and security activities” and
“present a clear set of speciªc, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Na-
tions in conducting such activities better in the future.” See Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams,
“What Future for Peace Operations? Brahimi and Beyond,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 1
(Spring 2004), pp. 183–212.
5. See, for example, Hilaire McCoubrey and Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post–Cold
War Era (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000); Renata Dawn, International Policing in Peace
Operations: The Role of Regional Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Paul Diehl
and Joseph Lepgold, eds., Regional Conºict Management (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littleªeld,
2003); Connie Peck, Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations (Lanham, Md.:
Rowman and Littleªeld, 1997); Jane Boulden, ed., Dealing with Conºict in Africa: The United Nations
and Regional Organizations (New York: Palgrave, 2003); Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh
Sidhu, eds., The United Nations and Regional Security (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003); and
Paul Diehl, “Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century Peacekeeping,”
Global Society, Vol. 14, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 337–360.
6. This latter position is presented throughout Frederick H. Fleitz Jr., Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the
1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002).
sist that regional arrangements do not offer a panacea. Former UN Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for example, condemned regionalization as a
“dangerous” idea that threatened to weaken the internationalist basis of the
UN.7 Former UN Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart insisted that all
peace operations confront similar challenges and that non-UN actors could
make only a limited contribution.8 A former head of the UN’s Department of
Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding, also cautioned that most regional arrange-
ments lacked the experience, bureaucratic structures, and resources necessary
to conduct peace operations effectively.9 Similarly, the current head of the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, has warned
that regionalization has encouraged an “only in my backyard” approach that
spells trouble for regions that lack the necessary capacities.10 Finally, it has
been pointed out that no other organization retains the universal legitimacy of
the UN.11
We accept that for a variety of reasons the regional level of analysis is crucial
for understanding contemporary international security issues. Nevertheless,
suggesting that contemporary trends in peace operations are synonymous
with regionalization obscures some potentially important developments.12
First, as we demonstrate later, the range of actors is not limited to regional
arrangements—individual states and ad hoc coalitions of the willing have also
conducted and authorized operations. Advocates of coalitions of the willing,
including U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and John Howard’s gov-
ernment in Australia, insist that regional organizations are encumbered with
many of the same problems confronting the UN.13 Second, regional organiza-
tions and military alliances have engaged in crisis management beyond their
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7. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), p. 306.
8. Sir Brian Urquhart, email exchange with students from Marin Academy High School, UC
Berkeley’s Model UN Program, at Boalt Law School, March 1999, http://globetrotter.
Berkeley.edu/UN/Urquhart/urqchat99.peace.html.
9. Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 217.
10. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Everybody’s Doing It,” World Today, Vol. 59, Nos. 8/9 (August/
September 2003), pp. 35–36.
11. Luiz Carlos de Costa, principal ofªcer of the undersecretary general for peacekeeping opera-
tions, “Supporting Peace in New Kinds of Conºict,” address delivered at the Seminar on Crisis
Management and Information Technology, Helsinki, Finland, September 30, 2002, p. 4.
12. Both Luiz Carlos de Costa (ibid., p. 4) and Jean-Marie Guéhenno (“Everybody’s Doing It”) re-
cently used this label.
13. According to Australia’s foreign minister, Alexander Downer, multilateralism is a “synonym
for an ineffective and unfocused policy involving internationalism of the lowest common denomi-
nator,” and multilateral organizations are “behemoths.” Quoted in Michelle Gratton, “The World
According to Howard,” Age (Melbourne), July 2, 2003.
own borders, as NATO’s involvement in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and the
EU’s operations in Macedonia, Bosnia, and the DRC, demonstrate.
The UN charter created a system ºexible enough not to grant the Security
Council a monopoly of authority on issues of international peace and secu-
rity.14 As Slovenia’s ambassador to the Security Council argued at the time of
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the council has a primary but not exclusive
responsibility for peace and security; and in cases where the council fails to act
in response to a threat to the peace, other agents can legitimately choose to do
so.15 Although the UN charter permits its members to use force only in self-
defense or with the council’s authorization, it does not prohibit “intervention
by invitation.”16 Nor does the charter resolve the fundamental moral dilem-
mas raised by the issue of humanitarian intervention. As Secretary-General
Koª Annan asked with respect to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, if “in those
dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of states had been
prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt
Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed
the horror to unfold?”17
It is therefore not surprising that the question of where authority resides in
relation to peace operations has frequently proved controversial.18 For exam-
ple, the issue arose over Palestine in 1948 (in relation to the Arab League),
Hungary in 1956 (in relation to the Warsaw Pact), and the Dominican Republic
in 1965 (in relation to the Organization of American States, OAS). These cases
raised two main questions. First, was it legitimate for non-UN actors to uphold
the UN’s principles and purposes without the organization’s prior authoriza-
tion? Second, when the crisis in question lay within a regional arrangement’s
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French Ministry of Defense, “Letters to the Editor,” Survival, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 2003),
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15. S/PV.3988, March 24, 1999, pp. 6–7.
16. The government of a state is legally entitled to request assistance from other states in the sup-
pression of rebel groups. See Michael Byers, “Terrorism, the Use of Force, and International Law
after 11 September,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 2002),
pp. 403–404.
17. “Secretary-General’s Annual Report to the General Assembly,” September 20, 1999, cited by
Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2000), p. 294.
18. See Norman J. Padelford, “Regional Organization and the United Nations,” International Orga-
nization, Vol. 8, No. 2 (May 1954), pp. 203–216; and Francis O. Wilcox, “Regionalism and the United
Nations,” International Organization, Vol. 19, No. 3 (July 1965), pp. 789–811.
borders, did the UN or the regional organization have the principal authority
to act? The Palestine case provides an example of the ªrst question. In 1948 the
League of Arab States claimed that it was acting to uphold the principles and
purposes of the UN charter when its forces entered Palestine in response to
Israel’s declaration of independence. This plea was rejected by the United
States and not discussed further within the Security Council.19 A cease-ªre
agreement was arranged the following year, and one of the UN’s ªrst peace
operations, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, deployed to
monitor it.20 The Hungarian case illustrates the second question. In 1956 the
Soviet Union justiªed its intervention in Hungary to suppress a pro-democ-
racy movement not by insisting that it was upholding the principles and pur-
poses of the UN but by arguing that within the Warsaw Pact zone, the pact
took precedence over the UN charter.21 Once again, though, the Security Coun-
cil did not discuss the question at length.
The OAS operation in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is more instructive
precisely because the Security Council discussed it at some length. As violence
spread through the republic following a coup, U.S. Marines were deployed, os-
tensibly to protect U.S. citizens. Following criticism from both OAS members
and wider international society, the United States pushed for the mission to be
brought under OAS auspices. It succeeded despite the deep misgivings of
some of the organization’s members, notably Brazil. In the Security Council,
the Soviet Union, France, and the Asian and African representatives were
highly critical of the United States, insisting that only the Security Council had
the authority to mandate military actions. The United States argued that chap-
ter 8 of the charter gave the OAS a legitimate role to play, but it failed to per-
suade the council of its case. Nevertheless, the United States continued to
argue that it was legitimate for regional organizations to take action within
their sphere of inºuence without UN authorization.22
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Similar debates reappeared in earnest in 1999 with NATO’s intervention in
Kosovo. Although ECOWAS (three times), SADC (twice), and NATO (once)
had acted earlier in the decade, the relationship between regional arrange-
ments and the UN had received relatively little attention. NATO’s 1995 Opera-
tion Deliberate Force and subsequent International Force and Stabilization
Force missions were authorized by the UN and thus did not generate much
controversy with regard to legitimacy. Similarly, despite signiªcant rifts within
ECOWAS, the Security Council retroactively endorsed its operations in Liberia
in 1990, Sierra Leone in 1997, and Guinea-Bissau in 1999.
SADC’s operations, however, were more problematic. In 1998 two different
groups of states claimed to be operating under SADC’s authority when they
conducted operations in Lesotho (South Africa and Botswana) and in the DRC
(Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe). Both cases were examples of “intervention
by invitation” involving enforcement activities. Whereas the Security Council
did not publicly discuss the South African–led Operation Boleas in Lesotho, it
did comment on the operations in the DRC but neither explicitly endorsed nor
explicitly condemned them. Initially, the council emphasized “the need for all
States to refrain from any interference in each other’s internal affairs.”23 Later,
however, it distinguished between invited and uninvited (primarily Rwandan
and Ugandan) forces within the DRC.24 When Zimbabwe argued that its inter-
vention was in accordance with UN principles and purposes to uphold the ter-
ritorial integrity of a member state and to prevent its government from being
toppled by invading forces, the council did not explicitly reject its line of rea-
soning.25 In contrast, the Security Council explicitly rejected the argument put
forward by Rwanda and Uganda that their military intervention in the DRC
was justiªed in terms of national self-defense.26
During much of the 1990s, therefore, peace operations conducted (and
sometimes authorized) by regional organizations tended to be either uncontro-
versial in terms of their legitimacy and their wider impact on the international
rules governing the use of force, or they were ignored by the Security Council.
By the end of the decade, however, these dilemmas reemerged in earnest. On
the one hand, NATO’s apparent success in the Balkans encouraged Western
leaders to openly advocate regionalization. For example, President Bill
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24. See Security Council resolution 1234, April 9, 1999.
25. See S/PV.3987, March 19, 1999.
26. See Security Council resolution 1304, June 16, 2000.
Clinton’s presidential decision directive 71, released on February 24, 2000,
identiªed the strengthening of the capacity of regional organizations as a ma-
jor objective. On the other hand, since 1999 a variety of actors have undertaken
peace operations without UN authorization, including NATO in Kosovo and
Australia in the Solomon Islands.27 Both NATO and Australia contended that
they could conduct more effective operations than the UN and that they had
the political authority to mandate such actions. In NATO’s case, U.S. Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright repeatedly argued that the alliance did not need
UN Security Council authorization because the North Atlantic Council, which
at that time comprised ªfteen liberal democracies, was a more legitimate voice
on the use of force than the Security Council, which included many non-
democracies. According to Secretary of State Albright, repressive regimes
should not be given the opportunity to veto humanitarian action by a coalition
of liberal democracies.28
To what extent have these challenges encouraged non-UN peace operations?
Table 1 shows UN peace operations under way in February 2005. It highlights
two important points. First, of the nine UN peace operations created since
1999, all but one (the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea [UNMEE]) has en-
joyed close relationships with non-UN actors.29 UNMEE is a traditional peace-
keeping operation composed primarily of the Standing High Readiness
Brigade. Second, with the partial exception of Africa, UN peace operations
remain absent from many of the world’s most troubled areas, including
Afghanistan, the Balkans, Chechnya, Colombia, Iraq, Palestine, Sri Lanka, and
Sudan. These gaps have been partially ªlled by non-UN actors, as Table 2
demonstrates.
As Table 2 shows, in 2003–04 non-UN actors created eight new peace opera-
tions in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Paciªc. This suggests that the prolifera-
tion of new peace operations will not necessarily increase the regional bias
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27. Although it should be noted that the Australian-led mission in the Solomon Islands had host-
state consent, the fact remains that the Australian government chose not to seek the approval of
the Security Council. We are not implying that Australia was either morally or legally obliged to
do so, just that it self-consciously chose not to.
28. See Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society (London: Palgrave, 2002), p. 87.
29. The UN Mission in Kosovo enjoyed a close relationship with NATO; the UN’s Mission in the
DRC (MONUC) was temporarily bolstered by the French-led Interim Emergency Multinational
Force (IEMF); the UN’s missions in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone all enjoyed close links
with ECOWAS; the UN’s operation in Burundi (ONUB) replaced the AU’s earlier mission; the
UN’s mission in East Timor (UNMISET) was partly composed of the follow-on military compo-
nent of the previous Australian-led coalition (INTERFET); and the UN’s stabilization mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH) followed the U.S.-led multinational force.
evident in UN missions, but neither is it likely to reduce that bias.30 Taken to-
gether with Table 1, three patterns are discernable. First, after a move from UN
to non-UN peace operations between 1999 and 2003, that trend seems to have
stalled in 2004. Although in 2003 there were six new non-UN operations and
only one UN mission, that pattern was reversed in 2004 with three new UN
missions and only one new non-UN operation. The pattern is clearer if the size
of each mission is taken into consideration. In 2003–04, 23,590 new UN peace-
Who’s Keeping the Peace? 165
30. Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman, “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?” International
Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2003), p. 49. Gilligan and Stedman argue that there is “evi-
dence of regional bias in the UN’s selection of missions, but the worst bias is against Asia, not Af-
rica.” The probable explanation for this bias can be found in the creation of relatively strong states
in Asia and their insistence on an “ASEAN way” of noninterference.
Table 1. United Nations Peace Operations (as of February 2005)
Operation Date Created Location
Approximate
Authorized Size
UNTSO 1948 Middle East 160
UNMOGIP 1949 India-Pakistan 90
UNFICYP 1964 Cyprus 1,270
UNDOF 1974 Golan Heights 1,040
UNIFIL 1978 Lebanon 1,990
MINURSO 1991 Western Sahara 240
UNOMIG 1994 Georgia 500
UNMIK 1999 Kosovo 300 (civilians)
MONUC 1999 Democratic Republic
of Congo
16,700
UNAMSIL 1999 Sierra Leone 17,500
UNMEE 2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea 4,200
UNMISET 2002 East Timor 5,000
UNMIL 2003 Liberia 15,000
UNOCI 2004 Côte d’Ivoire 6,240
MINUSTAH 2004 Haiti 6,700
ONUB 2004 Burundi 5,650
NOTE: Abbreviations used: UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization), UNMOGIP (UN Mil-
itary Observer Group in India and Pakistan), UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus),
UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force), UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon),
MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara), UNOMIG (UN Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo), UNMIK (UN Mission in
Kosovo), MONUC (UN Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo), UNAMSIL
(UN Mission in Sierra Leone), UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea), UNMISET (UN
Mission in Support of East Timor), UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia), UNOCI (UN Operation
in Côte d’Ivoire), MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti), and ONUB (UN Operation
in Burundi).
Table 2. Non–United Nations Peace Operations, 2003–04
Operationa Duration Location
Authorizing
Bodyc
Operational
Commandc
Approximate
Size
Joint Control
Commission
1992–
present
Georgia/South
Ossetia
Russia–Georgia–
South Ossetia
Russia 1,500
Unnamed 1994–
present
Georgia-Abkhazia CIS Russia 2,000
SFOR 1996–
2004
Bosnia UN NATO 11,900
KFOR 1999–
present
Kosovo UN NATO 20,000
Operation
Palliser
2000–
present
Sierra Leone United
Kingdom–Sierra
Leone
United
Kingdom
1,300
SAPSDb 2001–03 Burundi South Africa–
Burundi
South
Africa
750
Allied
Harmony
2002–03 Macedonia NATO NATO 470
ISAF 2002–
present
Afghanistan UN NATO
since 2003
5,500
Unnamed 2002–
present
Central African
Republic
CEMAC CEMAC 380
Operation
Licorne
2002–
present
Côte d’Ivoire France France 4,000
Operation
Concordia
2003 Macedonia EU EU 400
Operation
Artemis
2003 Democratic
Republic of Congo
UN France 1,500
AMIB 2003–04 Burundi AU AU 3,250
ECOMIL 2003–04 Liberia ECOWAS ECOWAS 3,200
ECOMICI 2003–04 Côte d’Ivoire UN-ECOWAS ECOWAS 1,500
Helpem Fren 2003–
present
Solomon Islands Australia–
Solomon Islands
Australia 3,000
AU Monitors
and Protection
Force
2004–
present
Darfur, Sudan AU AU 3,000
EUFOR 2004–
present
Bosnia UN EU 7,000
aAbbreviations used: SFOR (Stabilization Force), KFOR (Kosovo Force), SAPSD (South Afri-
can Protection Support Detachment), ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), AMIB
(African Union Mission in Burundi), ECOMIL (Economic Community of West African
States Mission in Liberia), ECOMICI (ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire), and EUFOR (Eu-
ropean Union Force).
bThe SAPSD was integrated into AMIB in May 2003.
cAbbreviations used: CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organization), CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Union of Central African States),
EU (European Union), AU (African Union), and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West
African States).
keeping troops were authorized, compared to 14,350 non-UN troops. Al-
though it is too early to draw deªnitive conclusions from these ªgures, clearly
the demand for UN peace operations remains. Second, these tables provide
further evidence that the label “regionalization” does not accurately capture a
more complex phenomenon involving various authorizing bodies and com-
mand structures. Third, states, coalitions, and organizations remain eager to
legitimize their activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
UN charter. The missions listed in Table 2 either were authorized by the Secu-
rity Council or had the consent of the host government and are therefore con-
sistent with article 2 of the UN charter. This suggests a subtle change in the
UN’s relationship with peace operations: from being the primary actor to pro-
viding collective legitimization for others while remaining a key actor in its
own right.31
A Typology of Non-UN Peace Operations
How should these developments be understood and what impact have they
had on international peace and security? Given that one of the central lessons
learned during the 1990s was that peace operations required better coordina-
tion between different parts of the UN system, is the proliferation of actors
likely to reduce the potential for success?32 It is helpful to start by distinguish-
ing between different types of non-UN peace operations. In particular, we
identify six broad categories of operation based on the actors conducting them
(individual states, coalitions of the willing, and regional arrangements) and
whether or not they received Security Council authorization.
individual states
Peace operations conducted by individual states are rare, but they are not un-
heard of. Rather than acting alone, individual countries tend to play the role of
pivotal states acting in tandem with others but nevertheless providing the in-
tellectual and material impetus for a mission. It is possible to discern four
types of individual/pivotal states that have conducted peace operations. The
ªrst are regional hegemons that sometimes use peace operations to maintain
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31. This role was foreseen by Inis Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the
United Nations,” International Organization, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July 1966), pp. 367–379.
32. See, for example, Ingvar Carlsson, Han Sung-Joo, and Rufus M. Kupolati, Report of the Inde-
pendent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/
1257, December 15, 1999, p. 42.
peace, security, and the status quo within their sphere of inºuence, and to pro-
tect their own regional interests. Such hegemons tend to operate under the
auspices of regional instruments that they dominate—for instance, Russian op-
erations under the auspices of the CIS in Georgia and Abkhazia, or the South
African–led Operation Boleas in Lesotho conducted under the umbrella of
SADC. Second, former colonial powers occasionally conduct operations in
their former colonies. In 2000, for instance, Britain sent troops to assist the be-
leaguered United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and since late
2002 French soldiers have helped enforce a cease-ªre and support an ECOWAS
force during Côte d’Ivoire’s ongoing civil war. Third, concerned neighbors
may act as pivotal states when crises emerge near their borders. The Italian-led
Operation Alba in Albania in 1997 would be one such example. Finally, great
powers might undertake peace operations to maintain the international status
quo. This was especially evident during the Cold War, when the great powers
recognized particular spheres of inºuence and regularly deployed their forces
to maintain order within them.
After the Cold War, individual states acting either as regional hegemons, for-
mer colonial powers, or concerned neighbors have become increasingly in-
volved in peace operations, as have great powers. Unilateral operations
remain rare, however, with British actions in Sierra Leone, French initiatives in
Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire, and the South African Protection
Support Detachment in Burundi being among the few examples. Most often,
hegemonic states tend to act under the legitimizing auspices of a regional ar-
rangement (as in the cases of Nigeria and Russia), and with the consent of the
host government. Reporting on the British role in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in the
late 1970s, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) concluded
that actions coordinated or conducted by individual states could enhance the
overall effectiveness of an operation and improve operational efªciency.33 This
was certainly true of the British and French operations in Sierra Leone and
Côte d’Ivoire respectively. Conversely, however, individual states acting more
in their own interests than of those they are ostensibly helping to protect can
impede the UN’s mediation efforts, prolong ªghting, and cause further human
misery.
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coalitions of the willing
As noted above, states usually prefer to act in concert with others when under-
taking peace operations. The difªculties that NATO experienced in trying to
reach and implement a consensus on Kosovo, however, have prompted some
states to make greater use of ad hoc coalitions rather than formal regional or
global arrangements.34 Coalitions of the willing are groups of actors that come
together, often around a pivotal state, to launch a joint mission in response to
particular crises. They may operate with or without formal authorization
from a regional or other international organization. Since NATO’s Kosovo
campaign in 1999, coalitions of the willing have undertaken peace operations
in Afghanistan, the DRC,35 East Timor, Haiti, and the Solomon Islands. In these
cases, pivotal states constructed coalitions to serve two primary functions:
share the material costs of the operation (the primary goal in East Timor) and
provide a degree of legitimization (the primary goal in Afghanistan and the
Solomon Islands). The French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force
(IEMF) to the DRC was also part of an attempt to test the capacity of the EU’s
common security and defense policy. As with actions by individual states, co-
alition operations may or may not be authorized by the Security Council. Of
the cases listed above, the UN International Force in East Timor, the ISAF in
Afghanistan, and the IEMF in the DRC were authorized by the council. In con-
trast, the council recognized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as
a legitimate act of self-defense. In the Solomon Islands case, although the
Australian-led mission did not receive Security Council authorization, it did
have the consent of the host government.
Coalitions provide the ºexibility and operational efªciency of unilateral ac-
tion but offer the potential for greater collective legitimization. Thus, to win le-
gitimacy for its operation in the Solomon Islands, Australia created a coalition
comprising Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and
Vanuatu and obtained a declaration supporting the operation from the Paciªc
Islands Forum.36 Although Australia provided the large majority of the re-
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sources and personnel, as well as virtually all the political and operational di-
rection, it was able to resist the charge of neocolonialism because it was not
acting unilaterally (see below). Coalitions, however, are not without their
problems as alternative sites for the authorization and legitimization of peace
operations: they are self-constituting, they may exert undue pressure to gain
host-state consent, and they do not represent the will of international society to
the same extent as the UN Security Council and General Assembly.
regional arrangements
Since the end of the Cold War, regional arrangements have played a more pro-
nounced role in peace operations. Before 1989 the Commonwealth, the OAS,
and the Organization of African Unity were among the few organizations to
conduct peace operations. Since then, a panoply of organizations including
CEMAC, the CIS, ECOWAS, the EU, NATO, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, and the SADC have done so. As noted above, the most
appropriate relationship between regional arrangements and the UN remains
controversial. In the 1990s many of these organizations conducted peace oper-
ations under their own authority, though only NATO has engaged in enforce-
ment action without the explicit sanction of either the Security Council or the
host government.37 It is this latter, relatively rare type of operation that poses
the most signiªcant challenge to the UN system.
As with individual states and coalitions, the legitimacy and effectiveness of
peace operations conducted by regional organizations is contested. On the one
hand, advocates argue that they are more legitimate and accountable than uni-
lateral operations; their permanent bureaucracies can provide helpful settings
to coordinate responses to regional crises; and the regional norms they foster
help utilize the beneªts of unilateralism (e.g., rapidity, political commitment,
and efªciency) while moderating its dangers.38 Critics, however, argue that
permanent regional organizations are encumbered with the same bureaucratic
and decisionmaking problems that confront the UN; they do not necessarily
confer legitimacy; and an undue focus on regional organizations encourages
International Security 29:4 170
37. Although in Liberia during the 1990s the ECOWAS Monitoring Group had the consent of the
ofªcial government led by Amos Sawyer, in practice it proved impossible to avoid enforcement ac-
tion against Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia forces, which controlled most of
the country if not the executive mansion.
38. See Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations
Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989); and Connie L. McNeely, Constructing the Nation-State:
International Organization and Prescriptive Action (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1995).
the idea that peoples should receive only the level of peace operations their
own region can provide.39
We identify six broad categories of non-UN peace operations (see Table 3).
This information suggests that since the late 1990s, states have become more
ºexible about the types of actors they are prepared to work with and the
means of legitimization. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the UN’s purposes
and principles has not been fundamentally challenged. With few exceptions,
actors continue to legitimize their peace operations by acquiring Security
Council authorization or subsequent support, gaining the agreement of the
host government, or in some cases both. Finally, although regional arrange-
ments have assumed greater roles in relation to peace operations, there has
been a shift away from supporting organized multilateralism toward ad hoc
coalitions. Not only have some individual states (such as Australia and the
United States) adopted this position, but clauses within the EU’s draft consti-
tutional treaty (July 2003) refer to the idea of “structured” cooperation based
on “high military capability criteria” (article 3-208) and the implementation of
certain European Security and Defense Policy related tasks by a “group” of
willing and able member states (article 3-206).
Peace Operations: Legitimacy, Mandates, and Stable Peace
To assess the impact these non-UN peace operations have had on international
peace and security, we analyze one contemporary example of each type of
actor (identiªed above) operating without explicit Security Council authoriza-
tion. In each case, we explore the operation’s legitimacy, its success in ac-
complishing the mandate, and its impact on peace and security in the region.
Before doing so, however, this framework requires some elaboration.
legitimacy
The legitimacy of a peace operation is crucial for reasons related to its impact
on international peace and security and the norms relating to the use of force,
and the likelihood of successfully accomplishing its mandate. An operation
deemed illegitimate by international society is less likely to enhance interna-
tional peace and security because the outcomes of that operation will not re-
ceive international validation and because both the interveners and subjects of
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Table 3. Non–United Nations Peace Operations: A Typology with Examples
Actor
With UN Security Council
Authorizationa
Without UN Security Council
Authorizationa
Individual states UK in Sierra Leone (2000–
present)c
France in CAR (1996–97)c
Côte d’Ivoire (2002)c
South Africa in Burundi (2001)c
Coalitions of
the willing
UNITAF in Somalia
(1992–93)b
Helpem Fren in Solomon
Islands (2003–present)c
Operation Turquoise in Rwanda
(1994)
Operation Alba in Albania (1997)
INTERFET in East Timor (1999)
ISAF in Afghanistan (2002–present)
IEMF in DRC (2003)
MNF in Haiti (2004)
Regional
arrangements
NATO (KFOR) in Kosovo (1999–
present)
ECOWAS in Côte d’Ivoire (2003–
present)
NATO in Afghanistan (2003–
present)
NATO in Bosnia (1996–2004)
EU in Bosnia (2004–present)
CIS in Tajikistan (1993–2003)c
ECOWAS in Liberia (1990–97)c
Sierra Leone (1997–2000)c
Guinea-Bissau (1999)c
Liberia (2003)c
SADC in Lesotho (1998)
CEMAC in CAR (2002–present)c
DRC (1998)c
NATO in Kosovo (1999)b
Macedonia (2002–03)c
EU in Macedonia (2003)c
AU in Burundi (2003–04)c
Sudan (2004–present)c
aAbbreviations used: UNITAF (UN Task Force), INTERFET (International Force in East
Timor), ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), IEMF (Interim Emergency Multina-
tional Force), DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), MNF (Multinational Force), NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization), KFOR (Kosovo Force), EU (European Union), CAR
(Central African Republic), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), CIS
(Commonwealth of Independent States), SADC (Southern African Development Commu-
nity), CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Union of Central African States), and AU (African
Union).
bMissions conducted without host-government consent.
cMissions subsequently welcomed by the UN Security Council in either a resolution or pres-
idential statement.
the intervention are likely to incur material costs.40 Similarly, within the war
zone itself, an illegitimate operation is unlikely to win the support of the host
population, making it exceptionally difªcult for its personnel to complete their
mandate and promote long-term peace and security.41 The domestic aspect of
legitimacy plays an important role in shaping whether a mission accomplishes
its mandate and establishes stable peace. As a result, the primary concern here
is with the international elements of legitimacy.
There are at least three relevant approaches to understanding legitimacy and
the process of legitimization in international relations. The ªrst is a deonto-
logical approach, which holds that an act is legitimate if it conforms to moral
rules. Realist and communitarian writers, however, may point out that within
the international sphere there are few moral rules that are binding and com-
mon to all. Cosmopolitans could raise a further problem by suggesting that
there are many cases where the moral responsibility to help others may de-
mand actions that break the rules. One example is the moral dilemma raised
earlier by Koª Annan over whether or not to intervene to stop the Rwandan
genocide without Security Council authorization. Moreover, deontological
rules sometimes make contradictory demands on agents and cannot therefore
act as the sole guide to the legitimacy of an action.
A second, or dialogic, approach to understanding legitimacy in international
relations suggests that an act is legitimate if the decisionmaking process con-
forms to particular moral principles.42 Decisions may be considered legitimate
if they are made on the basis of a genuine consensus (reached through exhaus-
tive dialogue) among all the parties likely to be affected by the proposed
course of action. Present conditions in world politics, however, are so alien to
the ideal state considered in this approach that virtually every decision taken
must be considered illegitimate. In addition, the dialogic approach creates the
logical possibility that a decision that produces intuitively immoral conse-
quences may nevertheless be legitimate.43
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43. For example, in 1978 there was virtual unanimity in international society that Vietnam’s inva-
sion of Cambodia and ousting of the Khmer Rouge was illegitimate. A purely dialogic under-
A third perspective, which is our preference, holds that an act is legitimate if
its perpetrators justify it in terms of reference points (legal or moral) that are
common to others and if those justiªcations are validated by other actors.44
This approach rejects the deontological claim that rules matter in themselves
and the dialogic insistence on the process of legitimization. Traditionally, states
have been considered the most important voices in this dialogue, but the legiti-
macy of an action could be enhanced by support from nonstate actors within
what the English School tradition refers to as “world society.”45 In practice,
there will be multiple and competing claims made through a common moral
or legal language. For example, when actors decide whether to legitimize an
act of humanitarian intervention, they must balance the competing claims of
human rights and sovereignty, both of which are grounded in common moral-
ity and international law.46 When states and other agents proffer justiªcations
for their actions, others act as “juries” weighing the balance of the different
claims.47 The greater the number of voices within international and world soci-
ety that validate the justiªcation, the greater the level of legitimacy it should be
accorded.48 This approach, which focuses on justiªcatory reasoning, is based
on two ideas: (1) states use a common language and set of reference points to
justify their behavior to others,49 and (2) states use these common reference
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national Law: Blair’s Wars against Kosovo and Iraq,” University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2003, p. 5.
49. This point was ªrst suggested in Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “How Do Norms Matter?” in Mi-
chael Byers, ed., The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and Interna-
tional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). We are grateful to Nicholas Wheeler for
bringing this to our attention.
points (among other factors) to assess how legitimate they perceive a particu-
lar act to be and how they should respond to it. Actors that decide a particular
action is legitimate are more likely to provide material and diplomatic support
than those that do not.
To assess the degree to which a particular peace operation is considered
legitimate, we ªrst outline the justiªcations offered by the interveners, focus-
ing on their claim to authority and the moral, legal, and political reasons they
provide. It is then necessary to ascertain the response of other members of
international and world society and ask whether the justiªcations were ac-
cepted and what impact the acceptance or nonacceptance of justiªcations had
on the wider support for the operation. Although an operation’s legitimacy is
important, it alone does not determine whether international peace and secu-
rity will be enhanced. Operations deemed illegitimate by international or
world society, or both, can promote peace and security (such as Vietnam’s in-
tervention in Cambodia in 1978), while the 1990s is replete with cases of legiti-
mate operations failing to produce such results. The second two elements of
the framework therefore address the level of success of the peace operation
itself.
mandates
How can the success of individual peace operations be assessed? What bench-
marks can be used to ascertain whether one category of peace operations is
more effective than another? Since the mid-1990s, analysts have proposed a
variety of answers to these questions. Arguably one straightforward approach
is to ask whether the mission fulªlled its mandate. This has the advantage of
remaining sensitive to different varieties of peace operations. For instance, tra-
ditional peacekeeping aims to create conditions conducive to the conclusion of
a political settlement by the parties to a conºict, whereas operations that man-
age transitions oversee sometimes extensive societal and political transforma-
tion.50 It would be disingenuous to use the same benchmarks to evaluate
different types of operations because they aim to accomplish different objec-
tives in different political contexts. Evaluating a peace operation according to
how well it accomplishes its mandate helps overcome this problem.
Using mandates alone to evaluate the success or failure of particular mis-
sions, however, is also problematic. Mandates are frequently vague and often
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leave signiªcant scope for different interpretations of what the mandate calls
for and whether or not it has been accomplished.51 In addition, non-UN peace
operations acting outside the authority of the Security Council do not always
clearly articulate a mandate. Instead, such missions are often justiªed in terms
of vague political goals.
A second problem, raised by Paul Diehl, is that a focus on mandates, “ig-
nores the common purposes peacekeeping operations share regardless of man-
date” including the limitation of armed conºict and conºict resolution.52 This
criticism, however, presupposes a higher degree of “common purpose” across
peace operations than the historical record suggests. Advocates of traditional
peacekeeping, arguably still the majority in the General Assembly,53 would as-
sert that the purpose of peace operations is neither the limitation of violence
nor conºict resolution per se. Instead, it is merely the monitoring of cease-ªres
in order to create conditions conducive to conºict resolution.
A third problem with using mandates as the sole benchmark for evaluating
an operation is that it may not reveal much about what was actually accom-
plished. A peace operation may be mandated to monitor a cease-ªre yet could
ªnd itself in the midst of an unfolding genocide. Using the mandate as the ba-
sis for evaluating the mission, one could conclude that the peacekeepers suc-
cessfully monitored the cease-ªre until it broke down; their mandate was not
to avert the genocide. Some analysts have attempted to get around this prob-
lem by suggesting the use of external criteria to evaluate peace operations.
William Durch insists that successful missions should tackle the underlying
causes of conºict54; Steven Ratner calls for the long- and short-term impact on
the target country to be the benchmark55; A.B. Featherston’s reconceptual-
ization of peacekeeping calls for conºict resolution to be at the heart of criteria
for success56; and R.C. Johansen maintains that a peacekeeping mission is suc-
cessful only if it contributes to “world peace.”57 The extent to which the man-
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57. Johansen, “UN Peacekeeping,” pp. 307–310.
date is accomplished should thus not be the only criterion used to assess a
peace operation, but it ought to be one aspect of any evaluation.
How, then, should the mandate be incorporated into an evaluation of peace
operations? First, it is important to assess the legitimacy and appropriateness
of the mandate in the particular historical circumstances. This overlaps closely
with the assessment of a mission’s legitimacy and requires further examina-
tion of the justiªcations and debates that surrounded the creation of a particu-
lar operation. When the mandate was formulated, did actors point to
deªciencies and likely problems? Was keeping down costs privileged over
protecting the victims of violence? A second task is to interpret the mandate.
There are likely to be many different interpretations, but three views are of
particular importance: those of the Security Council or the appropriate consti-
tuting authority, principal troop contributors, and signiªcant local actors.58
Problems are most likely to arise when there are signiªcant differences of inter-
pretation between these three groups of actors. Focusing on the intersubjective
understandings of the actors rather than on the written mandate helps to over-
come potential problems caused by the fact that many non-UN actors do not
set down formal mandates. Third, it is important to ascertain whether these
three types of actors believe that the mandate has been accomplished. These
three steps facilitate an assessment of whether or not the most relevant actors
believe that the mandate has been accomplished. This is a crucial test, because
if actors believe that non-UN peace operations are more effective than UN op-
erations, this is likely to encourage a trend toward the former and away from
the latter. Focusing exclusively on the mandate, however, may reveal little
about the overall contribution of a particular operation to international peace
and security. Therefore, the third element of our framework calls for an investi-
gation into the long-term effects of the peace operation.
stable peace
Focusing on the legitimacy of an operation and its success in accomplishing its
mandate does not directly reveal whether it contributed to stable peace within
the war zone and beyond. It thus becomes necessary to take longer-term trans-
formations into account. Featherston, for example, has argued that peacekeep-
ers should be in the business of conºict transformation and that in the long
term a peace operation should transform conºict-ridden societies by fostering
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conºict resolution processes.59 Similarly, Diehl argues that long-term strategic
priorities should be given greater weight than the short-term tactical goals that
dominate much of the analysis of peace operations.60
There are, however, at least four major difªculties with trying to evaluate a
peace operation’s long-term impact on peace and security. First, as Johansen
suggests, it is difªcult to develop long-term criteria to evaluate missions.61 For
example, expectations of what counts as “success” change over time. Second,
identifying causal relationships over the long term is problematic. Citing the
UN Mission to the Congo (1960–64) as a case in point, Daniel Druckman and
Paul Stern argue that “a return to chaos after a long period of time does not
make the earlier mission a failure.”62 It is too simplistic to suggest that the fail-
ure of a prior mission is a direct cause of future violence. Third, focusing on
the long-term impact of an operation postpones a verdict beyond a period that
may be useful for practical purposes. Finally, in some cases the requirements of
short-term and long-term peace may be contradictory. In territorial disputes,
for instance, cantonment may provide the only means of securing an end to vi-
olence in the short term. Over the longer term, however, cantonment may lay
the seeds for further violence and is likely to continue to exercise structural vi-
olence, as in present-day Bosnia and Cyprus, for instance.63
Despite these difªculties, to understand the impact of non-UN peace opera-
tions on international peace and security, it is important to make judgments
about such issues. Although expectations may change and there is often no
clear causal link between a failed operation and future violence, it is possible
to draw tentative, longer-term insights. First, it is reasonable to ascertain
whether levels of violence in both the respective war zone and the wider re-
gion have increased or decreased over time. Taking a longer-term perspective
that incorporates the period before the operation allows an empirical assess-
ment of its impact. Of course, this method alone cannot establish whether the
correlation between the operation and any reduction in violence is causal or
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coincidental. To make this argument, an assessment of the operation’s legiti-
macy and mandate is required. Second, because success and failure are subjec-
tive terms, the relevant intersubjective understandings of whether a particular
mission was judged a success (at the local, regional, and global levels) need to
be interpreted. Using intersubjective understandings rather than external crite-
ria as the benchmark accommodates the problem of shifting expectations and
contextualizes “success.” This is crucial because it is actors’ perceptions of suc-
cess and the reasons for it, rather than the empirical fact of success (however
deªned), that shape preferences for different types of peace operations.
To evaluate whether the proliferation of non-UN peace operations has made
a positive contribution to international peace and security, it is thus important
to assess an operation’s (1) legitimacy, (2) success in accomplishing the man-
date, and (3) contribution to stable peace and security. Inquiring into an opera-
tion’s legitimacy reveals important aspects about the relationship between the
UN and alternative sites of political authority, the degree of consensus about
how best to manage international society, and the likely problems that the op-
eration will confront once deployed. Assessing the operation’s success in ac-
complishing the mandate highlights the efªciency of different types of actors.
Observing perceptions of the mission’s contribution to peace and security
draws attention to the wider implications of individual missions. In the next
sections we use this framework to evaluate a contemporary example of each of
the types of non-UN peace operations conducted without Security Council
authorization.
Individual State: British Operations in Sierra Leone
In early May 2000, Britain deployed approximately 1,300 troops to Sierra
Leone as part of Operation Palliser. Within six weeks the majority of these
soldiers were withdrawn and a smaller contingent of approximately 200 left
behind to train an accountable and effective Sierra Leone army that, in tandem
with the UN operation UNAMSIL, would hopefully restore order to the coun-
try. In October the British government deployed another naval task force,
known as the Amphibious Ready Group and the Headquarters of the 1st
Mechanized Brigade (comprising approximately 650 personnel), to Sierra
Leone to bolster the beleaguered UN force and signaled its commitment to
deploy a further rapid reaction force of up to 5,000 troops if required.64
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The immediate catalyst, which provided the primary justiªcation for the op-
eration, was military intelligence from Britain’s 15-man “technical assistance”
team in Sierra Leone and what the Guardian newspaper described as a “panic-
stricken report” from the UN claiming that the capital, Freetown, was once
again poised to fall to rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces as it had
in January 1999.65 The underlying motives behind the operation, however,
were mixed and more complex. They included protecting British citizens,
averting a humanitarian crisis, defending democracy, supporting President
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (especially after the Arms-to-Africa affair66), and sup-
porting UNAMSIL and the future credibility of UN peacekeeping operations,
particularly in Africa.67
Initially the operation went smoothly with the troops securing Lungi airport
and evacuating British citizens and others to whom Britain had consular re-
sponsibility. On May 17, however, British paratroopers and Nigerian troops
killed four rebels about twenty miles from Lungi airport. This incident
sparked a series of debates not only about the risk to British soldiers but also
about the nature of their mandate in Sierra Leone.68 The next serious incident
concerned the capture of 11 British soldiers and a Sierra Leonean liaison ofªcer
by a group of rebels calling themselves the West Side Boys. After negotiations
to release the captive troops collapsed, a rescue mission, Operation Barras, was
launched on September 10. This succeeded in rescuing the hostages, although
in the process, one British soldier and many rebels were killed.69 Although
there were calls, most notably from the Conservative Party, for British troops
to withdraw following this incident, the British contingent was instead scaled
down as the situation in and around Freetown stabilized. Operation Barras
signaled that British troops could not be treated with the same degree of con-
tempt as UN personnel and arguably represented the crucial turning point
where the combined government, UN, and British forces gained the psycho-
logical upper hand over the rebels.
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When evaluating the legitimacy of Britain’s operation in Sierra Leone, on the
negative side some groups within world society questioned its motives, sug-
gesting it was driven by neocolonial desires to extract the country’s dia-
monds.70 There was also some skepticism about the British government’s
claims that it was ªghting for UN credibility in Sierra Leone given that all but
a few British troops operated outside UNAMSIL.71 Second, the Security Coun-
cil did not explicitly authorize the British operation.
Most actors within international and world society, however, accepted
Britain’s activities as legitimate. First, as soon as it became clear that the Lomé
accord (signed on July 7, 1999) had effectively collapsed, expectation within
Sierra Leone, the Security Council, and the wider West African region turned
to Britain to take a leading role in the international response. Given Britain’s
status as a former colonial power and the leader of the International Contact
Group formed to help mediate an end to the war, such expectations were un-
surprising.72 Second, given the concurrent debates about how the UN should
deploy peacekeepers to the DRC, UNAMSIL’s success was widely seen as be-
ing crucial for the future credibility of UN peace operations, especially in
Africa. After ECOMOG’s departure in early 2000, many members of the Secu-
rity Council and political commentators were content to see British forces sup-
port UNAMSIL’s activities even if they were not part of the UN force.73 At the
Security Council debate on May 11, 2000, for instance, the secretary-general,
Argentina, France, Malaysia, Namibia, Portugal (speaking on behalf of the
EU), Ukraine, and the United States all supported Britain’s activities. No states
explicitly criticized Britain’s actions, although both Bangladesh and Malaysia
argued that all international forces in Sierra Leone should be under UN com-
mand.74 Third, by early 2000, both within the Security Council and beyond, the
RUF was widely condemned for its brutal tactics (against civilians and UN
personnel) and deªned as the primary spoiler group within Sierra Leone.75 As
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook commented shortly after the arrival of British
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troops in Freetown, “I don’t see how we could maintain our self-respect if we
turned away from this kind of savagery.”76 Any efforts that weakened the RUF
as a military force were thus widely perceived as legitimate. Fourth, both
President Kabbah and Secretary-General Annan had appealed to the British
government, among others, for assistance.77 The fact that charges of neo-
colonialism were still leveled at Britain despite these important mitigating fac-
tors suggests that peace operations conducted by individual states are
considered legitimate only in extraordinary circumstances.
Did the mission accomplish its mandate? An evaluation of the effectiveness
of British operations provides a similarly positive assessment. Although lack-
ing an explicit UN mandate, the British government publicly stated its objec-
tives. These statements thus form the basis of our evaluation. Operation
Palliser’s initial objective was to help evacuate approximately 500 British citi-
zens and others for whom Britain had consular responsibility. This was
achieved by securing the area around Freetown, including Lungi airport. The
mission was then broadened to include assisting the deployment of further
UNAMSIL personnel. As Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon put it, Operation
Palliser was designed ªrst and foremost “to get British nationals out, and help
get UN reinforcements in.”78 Both objectives were achieved with only minor
instances of actual combat. Britain’s broader political strategy had three ele-
ments: to train and equip the government of Sierra Leone with an effective and
accountable army; to restore momentum to the peace process, speciªcally by
supporting an expanded UNAMSIL and funding the disarmament, demobili-
zation, and reintegration process; and to reduce the incentives that the illicit
trade in diamonds had provided for the violence. Signiªcant progress was
made in all these areas: British citizens were quickly evacuated; UNAMSIL
was expanded; the RUF was ªrst contained and then, following Operation
Barras, signiªcantly weakened as a military force; in May 2001 UN sanctions
were imposed on President Charles Taylor’s regime in Liberia to prevent the
illicit trade in Sierra Leone’s diamonds; and the war was ofªcially ended in
January 2002. The major problem has been that building stable peace in Sierra
Leone will be incredibly difªcult without addressing the wider regional di-
mensions of the conºict. Apart from efforts to curb the trade in conºict dia-
International Security 29:4 182
76. Quoted in “Cook’s Double Trouble,” Daily Telegraph, May 15, 2000.
77. “Sierra Leone Cruelly Exposes UN’s Crisis,” Guardian, May 6, 2000. See also S/2000/13, Janu-
ary 11, 2000, par. 25.
78. Statement to the House of Commons, May 23, 2000. See also statement by the prime minister’s
ofªce on Sierra Leone.
monds, British operations paid little attention to violence beyond Sierra
Leone—stoked in signiªcant part by Taylor’s forces—which engulfed Liberia,
Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire.79
With regard to the longer-term impact of Britain’s operations, even before
the war’s end, Sierra Leone had become a laboratory for a variety of peace-
building techniques. These included security sector reform (where Britain has
been instrumental in training and equipping the new army and police force),
judicial reform (including establishing a reconciliation commission and special
court, largely under U.S. auspices), and the building of governance structures
to ensure that people’s basic needs are met. While generally welcomed by
most observers, Britain’s peacebuilding efforts have attracted criticism on sev-
eral counts. First, questions have been raised about whether Sierra Leone re-
ally needs a professional army and whether overseeing two to three years of
national service might produce better long-term results.80 Second, doubts have
been raised about the importance and amount of money being spent on the
reconciliation commission and special court (which has relatively few poten-
tial suspects) rather than fulªlling the basic needs of the local population, es-
pecially those living outside Freetown.81 Third, Britain—unlike the United
States—has been reluctant to speak out against President Kabbah’s own poor
record on human rights and corruption, with critics questioning his ability and
desire to dismantle the patronage networks on which his own power rests.82
Whatever the criticisms, the British government has drawn several lessons
from its experiences in Sierra Leone. First, it considers Operation Palliser to be
a successful application of the expeditionary form of power projection set out
in its 1998 Strategic Defence Review.83 This is particularly important because
sometimes there may be no substitute for using military force against per-
sistent spoilers. Second, the government acknowledged that building peace
requires a long-term commitment of considerable (human and ªnancial)
resources.
What does the Sierra Leone case reveal about peace operations conducted
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by individual states? First, such operations may be considered legitimate in
certain circumstances. In this instance, the debate within international society
over the operation’s legitimacy focused on three questions: did the operation
contravene the norm of nonintervention? Was the operation neocolonial in
character? And was Britain abusing humanitarian arguments to justify the de-
ployment of military forces to further its own interests, as happened so often
during the colonial era? As this case demonstrates, even when conducted by
an individual state, peace operations can be considered legitimate when they
produce negative answers to all three questions. The operation did not break
the nonintervention rule because both President Kabbah and Secretary-
General Annan requested it. Although there were concerns about its neocolo-
nial character, most members of international and world society rejected them
because the operation directly supported an ongoing UN mission; it was rela-
tively small in size and short in duration. Finally, although Britain’s motives
were mixed, most observers argued that the operation was not inspired by a
desire to further Britain’s political or commercial interests in the narrow sense
of these terms. This suggests that peace operations by individual states can be
tolerated and even widely supported in certain contexts.
As for the question of whether the operation accomplished its short-term
mandate and encouraged regional peace and security in the longer term, the
conclusion is more mixed. Initially, Operation Palliser did succeed in defend-
ing Freetown and averting the immediate humanitarian crisis. However, with-
out the ongoing presence of UNAMSIL (which Britain was able to coordinate
and direct), it is unlikely that the British operation would have had the impact
that it did. The longer-term British commitment to building stable peace in
Sierra Leone is also positive, but again it requires continued support from the
UN and other international organizations. This suggests that although peace
operations conducted by individual states may be particularly adept at re-
sponding to immediate crises, over the longer term the wider elements of
peacebuilding require the resources, expertise, and commitment that few
states could invest alone. In addition, had Britain tried to operate in isolation,
the charge of neocolonialism would have undoubtedly been raised and could
have undermined the operation’s aims.
Coalition of the Willing: Regional Assistance in the Solomon Islands
In early June 2000, after a series of severe economic crises, the Solomon Islands
government was overthrown in a coup that sparked a civil war between
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the Guadalcanal and Malaitan people. The Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army
had arrived on the scene in 1999, raping and murdering Malaitans and pillag-
ing their settlements. The government was unable to halt the violence, and
the Malaitans responded by forming their own militia, the Malaitan Eagle
Force (MEF), which successfully raided police armories, seizing weapons and
ammunition. As the violence escalated, 22,000 Malaitans were forced to ºee
Guadalcanal and had their property dispossessed. It was these events that
prompted the MEF to overthrow the government and seize control of the
islands.84
Australia stepped in for the ªrst time in October 2000 when it helped broker
the hastily drafted Townsville agreement. Australia and New Zealand sent
fewer than 20 peacekeepers to oversee the implementation of the agreement,
and not surprisingly, it quickly unraveled. Police corruption remained en-
demic, and Prime Minister Allen Kemakeza used a compensation scheme in-
volving $25 million of loans from Taiwan to enrich his own family. The
following year, Australia and New Zealand stepped in once again to pay the
state’s bills, including for electricity, the absence of which had left public
ofªces suffering frequent blackouts.85 Both states, however, refused to send po-
lice ofªcers when requested by the government. As the Townsville agreement
collapsed, the Solomon Islands plunged closer to anarchy.
The catalyst for Australia’s decision to lead a coalition of the willing into the
Solomon Islands was the release of a report in July 2003 by the Australian Stra-
tegic Policy Institute (ASPI).86 The report argued that the collapse of govern-
ment in the Solomon Islands posed an important threat to Australian security
because it would make the Solomons a potential haven for organized interna-
tional criminals and, more worryingly, terrorists. A few days after the report
was released, the Australian government announced that it planned to form
the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and repeated
the security and humanitarian arguments put forward by ASPI. To help win
support within the region, Australia proposed a multinational force, compris-
ing elements from New Zealand as well as other Paciªc Island states (Fiji,
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Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu). In the end, a force of 2,200
was assembled, comprising 1,500 Australian soldiers, 300 soldiers from New
Zealand and the Paciªc islands, and 400 police ofªcers.
The primary source of legitimacy for the peace operation was an agreement
signed by the Solomon Islands and each of the interveners on July 24, 2003.87
The agreement noted that the peace operation had been formally requested by
the Solomon Islands government and had been endorsed by the Paciªc Islands
Forum, encompassing all the region’s island states. It went on to precisely de-
lineate the new force’s mandate, chain of command, and rules of engagement.
Both the agreement and RAMSI itself had the strong support of the over-
whelming majority of Solomon Islanders. Interestingly, when the question of
securing a UN mandate for the mission was raised (which, given the 2003
agreement, would probably have been a formality), the Australian govern-
ment rejected the proposal out of hand. Its foreign minister, Alexander
Downer, argued that the UN was an ineffective instrument and that a regional
coalition of the willing had greater authority to authorize such a mission and
would conduct the mission more effectively without the UN.88
Despite the agreement with the Solomon Islands government, some states
and commentators raised the question of whether Australia was acting as a
neocolonial power in the region. Earlier that year, the Australian government
had been accused of neocolonialism by Papua New Guinea when it proposed
to add conditionality to its development aid.89 Although in the Solomon Is-
lands case Australia hoped to avoid this charge by building a regional coali-
tion of the willing, it failed to escape completely. David Fickling, for example,
argued that although the deployment of peacekeepers was not particularly
troubling, the arrival of 100 bureaucrats to take over the administration of the
Solomon Islands resembled neocolonialism.90 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
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MEF leader, Manasseh Sogovare, also made this charge.91 On balance, how-
ever, the peace operation was widely perceived as legitimate precisely because
it adhered to the UN’s core principles inasmuch as the force had the host gov-
ernment’s consent and because Australia took measures to mitigate the charge
of neocolonialism by forging a coalition of the willing including New Zealand
and the other Paciªc island states.
Since its deployment, Operation Helpem Fren is widely perceived to have
accomplished its mandate, at least the short-term objectives. The agreement
between the interveners and the Solomon Islands government stated that the
operation’s immediate goal is to “assist in the provision of security and safety
to persons and property” (article 2), while article 9 of the agreement permits
the assistance mission to seize and destroy illegally held weapons.92 The agree-
ment does not speciªcally deªne the mission’s longer-term objectives. Imme-
diately before the force was deployed, the various militias agreed to cease their
violent activities. Concerns were raised about one militia leader in particular,
Harold Keke, in Guadalcanal. But after protracted negotiations with the head
of the mission, Australian diplomat Nick Warner, Keke agreed to a cease-ªre
and handed himself in to the authorities, who are investigating claims that he
was responsible for several murders. Keke relinquished only after being per-
suaded that the international administrators and police ofªcers would act with
impartiality and would halt the corruption and partiality that were rife prior to
Helpem Fren.93 The question of general disarmament proved more problem-
atic. RAMSI called for an amnesty on weapons in an attempt to persuade Solo-
mon Islanders to hand in their arms. Although thousands of weapons were
turned in, many thousands remained in circulation.94 RAMSI did ensure, how-
ever, that weapons were not displayed in public, and it presided over a dra-
matic reduction in the illegal use of ªrearms. Helpem Fren has largely
accomplished the security and law-and-order aspects of its mandate. The po-
litical and capacity-building elements require more time, but the coalition has
pledged its long-term commitment to these programs.
What was the impact of RAMSI on stable peace in the region? Following on
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from the aid conditionality dispute between Australia and Papua New
Guinea, there was a real danger that the peace operation could further sour re-
gional relations, damaging the cause of regional peace and security. That it has
not is largely due to the size of the coalition, which includes every state in the
region. As a result, the RAMSI experience has hinted at the creation of a new
era of cooperation between Paciªc states. In early 2004 the Australian govern-
ment announced the creation of a new agency within the Australian Federal
Police designed to police missions overseas. This is the ªrst such agency spe-
ciªcally created for this purpose and may help to address, albeit in a small way
initially, the policing problems that have dogged UN peace operations since
the end of the Cold War.95 By assembling a coalition, Australia also created an
opportunity to foster lasting cooperation in the region. If such cooperation per-
sists, and if it is successful in building state-capacity in the region, it could
have a signiªcant positive impact on regional peace and security. Moreover,
RAMSI avoided both the potential legitimacy problems caused by unilateral-
ism and the command and coordination problems associated with complex
multinational operations. The coalition added legitimacy while the operation
made use of Australian command and control, permitting a greater degree of
operational cohesion than is usually present in multinational operations.96
Operation Helpem Fren is also signiªcant because its pivotal state, Austra-
lia, expressly rejected UN involvement on both normative and instrumental
grounds. Nevertheless, the Security Council subsequently welcomed the peace
operation, particularly the participation of the Paciªc Islands Forum.97 This
was probably because the operation enjoyed host-state consent, thus allowing
the council to overlook Australia’s insistence that regional arrangements
should take precedence over the UN. The successful implementation of the
mandate suggests that pivotal states and coalitions of the willing make partic-
ularly effective peacekeepers because they can maintain a high level of opera-
tional coherence and direction. This insight must be tempered, however, by
recalling that the Solomon Islands militias were smaller and more poorly
equipped and funded than warring factions in many other parts of the world.
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There is thus no reason to believe that a UN operation or a regional organiza-
tion would not have been similarly successful. What the coalition did facilitate,
however, was a more rapid deployment than could have been organized by a
formal institution lacking a standing or rapid deployment force.
Regional Arrangement: The African Union Mission in Burundi
In October 1993 Burundi experienced what the U.S. Committee for Refugees
called a “slow-motion coup” in which Melchior Ndadaye, the elected presi-
dent, as well as the next two ofªcials in line to succeed to the presidency were
killed.98 The coup sparked sporadic waves of violence between the minority
Tutsi and majority Hutu population that have claimed between 250,000 and
300,000 lives, mainly civilians.99 A decade later, Burundi had 218,000 internally
displaced persons, 753,000 refugees, and nearly 1 million people needing
emergency food aid out of a population of approximately 7 million people.100
Although the UN Security Council did deploy a small number of civilian ob-
servers, it refused to offer military assistance to the stricken country.101 Conse-
quently, African initiatives have been the main source of external mediation,
primarily the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, the personal mediation ef-
forts of Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Nelson Mandela of South
Africa, the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) from 2001
to the present, and the African Union’s Mission in Burundi (AMIB) from 2003
to 2004. To understand AMIB’s origins and progress, it is therefore necessary
to understand how the SAPSD (which subsequently became AMIB’s advance
detachment) arrived in Burundi two years earlier.
In November 1999 Nelson Mandela succeeded the late Julius Nyerere as the
primary external mediator in Burundi’s conºict. Despite being accused of pro-
Hutu bias and strong-arming President Pierre Buyoya into accepting his pre-
ferred terms, Mandela successfully helped negotiate the Arusha agreement on
August 28, 2000. Six months later, Mandela announced a more concrete three-
year peace process that involved power sharing between Tutsi and Hutu polit-
ical parties. Several rebel groups, however, most notably Pierre Nkurunziza’s
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Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and Agathon Rwasa’s
National Liberation Front (FNL), were not invited. Consequently, the peace
process saw only a minimal reduction in the ªghting.102
In an attempt to get the peace process back on track, Mandela unilaterally
called for South African troops to be deployed to Burundi as part of a Very Im-
portant Person (VIP) protection operation to help guard twenty-six Hutu poli-
ticians (mainly members of the Front for Democracy in Burundi) who had
returned from exile and were anxious about the predominantly Tutsi army.103
In October 2001, 30 South African policemen arrived as reconnaissance for a
larger South African force. Initially, some locals were hostile toward these po-
lice, and they had to be protected by Burundian gendarmes. Shortly afterward,
approximately 750 South African troops arrived in Burundi tasked with pro-
tecting the VIPs and training a local, multiethnic VIP protection force. The
SAPSD was Mandela’s personal initiative and did not have an explicit man-
date to intervene in the civil war—the troops were to evacuate should the hos-
tilities resume in earnest and they become targets.
Was the operation legitimate? Although the SAPSD was deployed without
a UN Security Council mandate, several factors imbued the operation with
a high degree of legitimacy.104 First, with the occasional exception of Belgium
and France, since the 1993 coup the Security Council had consistently signaled
that no UN peacekeepers would be sent to Burundi. Mandela’s (and
Nyerere’s) efforts were thus widely seen as helping the UN deºect criticism
that it was ignoring Burundi’s conºict. Second, the Security Council strongly
endorsed the SAPSD only a few days after its deployment.105 And third, the
SAPSD was deployed at the request of Burundi’s government.
The question of whether the mission accomplished its mandate is more
problematic, however. Despite the South African presence, the security and
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humanitarian situations in Burundi continued to worsen throughout 2002.106
On December 2, 2002, however, another cease-ªre agreement was signed in
Arusha between Burundi’s transitional government and the CNDD-FDD. This
included provision for an African mission to monitor the cease-ªre, supervise
the cantonment of ªghters, as well as ensure the two sides observed commit-
ments to halt arms shipments, free political prisoners, and withdraw foreign
troops. Speaking in the Security Council shortly after this latest agreement,
South Africa’s Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, suggested that the envisaged
African force was a practical example of chapter 8 of the UN charter in action
that would “act as a bridging instrument, opening the situation for the UN to
come in when we have perfected the conditions.”107 Zuma’s argument was
later endorsed by the Security Council, which subsequently called for donors
to help set up the African mission as soon as possible in liaison with the UN.108
Following discussions with the UN about the mandate, ªnancing, and logis-
tics of the force, in February 2003, AU heads of state approved the union’s ªrst
armed peace operation, and in April more than 900 South African troops were
deployed as part of the AU Mission in Burundi for an initial period of one
year.109 As well as the tasks set out in the Arusha agreement, AMIB was also to
support the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the disarmament, demo-
bilization, and reintegration (DDR) process. At the end of April, the AU
appointed Mamadou Bah as head of AMIB, and on May 1, the SAPSD was in-
tegrated into AMIB, becoming its advance party. For several months, however,
the South African troops were forced to operate without the Ethiopian and
Mozambican contingents, which arrived in late September and mid-October
respectively. Both states cited concerns about the fragility of Burundi’s cease-
ªre and a lack of funds as reasons for their late arrival.110 By December 2003
AMIB’s strength stood at 2,645 troops.111
AMIB quickly faced military, political, and ªnancial problems. In military
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terms, it could not avoid being caught up in the civil war. Almost immediately
after AMIB’s arrival, Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura, suffered heavy shelling in
April and July from CNDD-FDD and Rwasa’s FNL troops respectively. And
on June 30, AMIB troops killed four CNDD-FDD rebels while defending their
cantonment zone in Muyange. Conversely, earlier that month South African
troops stood by and watched CNDD-FDD militia kill one person and loot
houses and shops in the town of Burumata, much to the anger of locals.112
However, after AMIB’s arrival, and especially after the signing of the two Pre-
toria Protocols,113 politically motivated violence did decrease—only to be re-
placed by violence of a more criminal nature—and the CNDD-FDD joined the
peace process.114 AMIB also faced enormous difªculties in trying to disarm ap-
proximately 70,000 rebel ªghters. Among other problems, several factions
were reluctant to participate; AMIB lacked the resources to meet the basic
needs of those combatants it did disarm; and as late as November 2003, AMIB
lacked a ªnalized DDR plan (including a clear deªnition of a combatant).115
Politically, AMIB became caught up in international differences over how
best to resolve the civil war. In particular, Deputy President Zuma publicly
questioned the Tanzanian and Ugandan role in supplying weapons to various
factions (especially the CNDD-FDD) and objected to these states’ troops being
deployed as part of AMIB.116 AMIB also faced serious ªnancial difªculties. As
Mamadou Bah pointed out in late 2003, of the $120 million required to fund
AMIB’s operations for a year, only $20 million had been made available.117
Did AMIB play a role in the establishment of stable peace in the area? On
balance, by December 2003 it had contributed to a far more stable security situ-
ation in Burundi than existed upon its arrival.118 Indeed, Deputy President
Zuma considered the situation stable enough to ask the UN to take over from
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the AMIB as set out in the Arusha agreement and the AU’s Addis Ababa com-
muniqué creating the force.119 Initially, however, Secretary-General Annan
suggested that the security situation remained precarious and that peace was
unlikely to last without signiªcant improvements in the living conditions of
the local population. This was a worrying situation given that by December
2003, the UN’s annual Consolidated Appeal for Burundi had received only $21
million of the promised $72 million of nonfood assistance.120 Nevertheless,
AMIB was able to stabilize the situation sufªciently for the new UN Operation
in Burundi to assume its responsibilities in June 2004.
Despite some disagreements within the AU, AMIB was widely seen as a le-
gitimate operation, although strictly speaking it conducted enforcement activi-
ties without UN Security Council authorization. Operationally, AMIB’s key
problems were its inability to make serious progress on DDR and deter all
spoiler groups, which subsequently turned to criminal as opposed to political
violence. More fundamentally perhaps, despite pledges of support from other
African states, South Africa was the only state to commit troops from the de-
ployment of the SAPSD in 2001 until late 2003. Nevertheless, under South
Africa’s leadership, AMIB acted as an important support mechanism for build-
ing conªdence in the Arusha agreement and was able to respond ºexibly to
developments on the ground through the brokering of the two Pretoria Proto-
cols. In the longer term, the difªculty will be building stable peace in Burundi
despite the lack of funds.
Conclusion
Has the proliferation of non-UN peace operations enhanced international
peace and security? Or has it encouraged a multitiered, regionalized system
that threatens to undermine the UN’s global mission? Our framework identi-
ªes three central factors to answer these questions: an operation’s legitimacy,
its ability to achieve its mandate, and its contribution to long-term peace and
security in the target region. Of course, it is difªcult to draw deªnitive judg-
ments from three cases conducted by different actors and on an ad hoc basis.
Nevertheless, some important trends can be discerned.
First, are non-UN peace operations legitimate, or do they constitute a funda-
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mental challenge to the basic precepts of the post-1945 UN system? What is
striking about all three cases, particularly when considered in light of earlier
debates about the relationship between regional arrangements and the UN, is
that although they were non-UN operations, with the exception of some state-
ments by the Australian government, they were not anti-UN operations.121
None of the operations assessed here fundamentally challenged the core ele-
ments of the UN system, which permits the use of force with Security Council
authorization, in self-defense, or when conducted at the invitation of the host
government. Thus, although the UN was not the primary actor in any of the
three cases, the UN charter’s core norms were not violated. In Sierra Leone,
UN peacekeepers proved a crucial element in the success of the British opera-
tion, while in Burundi the Security Council refused to deploy troops for more
than a decade yet supported the SAPSD and AMIB. Only in the Solomon
Islands case was the UN expressly denied involvement, but even here the op-
eration enjoyed host-state consent and was subsequently welcomed by the Se-
curity Council. It could therefore be argued that by acting in accordance with
the UN’s norms, these non-UN peace operations have actually reinforced
them. Nevertheless, the recurrence of the charge of neocolonialism was an im-
portant feature in two of the three cases (Sierra Leone and Solomon Islands).
This indicates that Western states in particular will need to work hard to
achieve international legitimacy for their peace operations, especially those
that take place without explicit Security Council authorization.
Were these missions successful in achieving their mandates and promoting
stable peace? In contrast to the U.S. experience in Somalia, a notable feature of
Operation Palliser was its ability to operate in a “ªreªghting” and enforcement
capacity alongside a preexisting UN mission. This was made easier by the idea
that impartiality should be deªned in terms of the UN’s principles and the
mission’s mandate. Such cohabitation invariably raises problems of command
and control, but despite a few hiccups in the Sierra Leone case, the relationship
proved mutually reinforcing. The key difference between British operations in
Sierra Leone and U.S. activities in Somalia was that the former were carefully
limited in scale, scope, and time, and the objectives did not conºict with those
of the UN mission. Similarly, in Burundi, the AMIB would not have been pos-
sible without the earlier SAPSD, South Africa’s continued leadership, and
Western funding for the other contingents. The result was the AU’s ªrst armed
International Security 29:4 194
121. We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this formulation.
peace operation. Finally, the Solomon Islands case suggests that an ad hoc co-
alition may help foster longer-term regional cooperation in security and gover-
nance. In addition, it suggests that non-UN actors can deploy more rapidly
than the UN, particularly where one state is either operating unilaterally or
playing a pivotal role in a coalition.
Although these cases are relative success stories (at least in the short term), it
is important to sound a note of caution. In Sierra Leone, British operations
could not have been so successful without the presence of a much larger UN
force (UNAMSIL). For its part, Operation Helpem Fren confronted groups
more closely resembling poorly organized criminal gangs than the types of
warring factions confronted elsewhere by other peacekeepers. Although the
UN may not have deployed as rapidly as the Australian-led coalition, there is
no reason to believe that it could not have achieved a similarly positive result.
Finally, AMIB troops confronted many familiar problems that UN peacekeep-
ers had faced in the 1990s: many were inexperienced, underfunded, and
poorly equipped, and all but the South African contingents arrived either very
late or not at all. This suggests that the leadership and commitment offered by
the pivotal state is fundamental to the overall effectiveness of the mission.
The potential danger raised by these non-UN missions is that poorer parts of
the world could be denied access to high-quality peace operations by virtue of
their geographic location and strategic insigniªcance to Western powers.
Hence, in the longer term a consistent trend toward non-UN peace operations
could undermine international peace and security. This conclusion is at least
partly borne out by the Burundi case in which ªrst South Africa and later the
AU came forward out of necessity because the Security Council refused to
countenance the deployment of a UN peace operation. Non-UN peace opera-
tions can therefore ªll some of the gaps in the UN’s uneven coverage. They
should, however, be continually evaluated to ensure that they are helping to
maintain international peace and security and not eroding the UN’s commit-
ment to assist all the world’s regions, not just those that are strategically im-
portant to Western states.
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